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Abstract 
 
In his paper we investigate the performance determinants of Nordic private 
equity funds.  In this study we look at the industry at the fund level as opposed to 
the portfolio company level. To proxy for performance, we use both the Internal 
Rate of Return (IRR) and Total Value to Paid-In capital ratio (TVPI) as the 
dependent variable in our model, both of which are the standard metrics of 
performance in the private equity industry.  Having reviewed the relevant 
literature, we define three groups of factors, or independent variables: the Fund 
characteristics (size, vesting period, stage, geographical and industrial 
specialization), General Partner characteristics (sequence of the fund), and 
Principal-Agent Relationship characteristics (managerial fee, carry profit, 
simultaneous management).  Using the proprietary data provided by an 
investment firm specializing in the Nordic secondary private equity market, we 
have examined 52 private equity funds with operations in the Nordic region.  
Factors such as size, vesting period, geographical specialization, sequence, 
managerial fee and simultaneous management are found to have a significant 
impact on the fund performance.  According to our results, the Nordic funds that 
are likely to deliver high returns, exhibit the following characteristics: size less 
than excessively large, vesting period shorter than average, relatively broad 
geographical focus, being among the funds first raised by a given private equity 
firm, low managerial fee, and, finally, being managed simultaneously with other 
funds.  The robustness tests performed indicate stability of the signs of the 
coefficients. Furthermore, these tests uncover an interesting interaction between 
the sequence of the fund and the simultaneous management variables, possibly as 
a result of the private equity fund manager skill accumulation process.  The 
findings set the ground for further studies, such as closer examination of the 
causality between the fund performance and fund characteristics, interaction 
between the independent variables, or comparison of Nordic private equity fund 
performance versus those of other regions. 
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1. Objective and Motivation 
Our research topic is the private equity industry
1
 with focus on Nordic funds.  
Despite private equity gaining importance as an asset class worldwide
2
 and in 
Nordics in particular
3
, the in-depth analyses of the main factors driving the 
performance of Nordic private equity funds are scarce. 
We have focused on the secondary private equity market, which includes 
transactions of pre-existing investments in private equity funds.  Inherently, 
private equity is an illiquid asset class and is aimed to be a buy-and-hold long 
term investment.  However, the desire of many investors to increase and diversify 
exposure to private equity, as well as liquidity needs, have led to a significant 
growth of the secondary market during the past two decades.  It has been 
estimated to have increased from about USD 4.4 bill in 1997, to about USD 63 
bill in 2007 (Peterman and Lai 2009).  2011 was named “the busiest year on 
record in the private equity secondary market” by Cogent Partners, a private 
equity-focused investment bank providing advisory services to the secondary 
private equity market. 
One of the reasons why secondary private equity market is so hot even during 
the global financial downturn is that sellers view it as a source of liquidity and 
exit.  For the buyers, on the other hand, it is an opportunity to hand-pick funds, 
and buy interests at possibly discounted prices.  Portfolio diversification and 
optimization is also an important driver in the rise of the secondary private equity 
market.  
Secondary PE transactions can be generally divided into two categories: sales 
of limited partnership interests (to a fund of funds typically) and sales of direct 
interests in portfolio companies (a buyer typically being another private equity 
fund) (Dodge and Leibler 2010).  The incentives driving these two kinds of 
transactions can be slightly different: limited partners might be motivated to sell 
their interest due to a change in strategic positioning, regulatory change or cash 
                                                 
1
 We consider so-called private equity funds, which primarily invest in buyout and venture capital. 
2
 Capital raised globally by PE funds has increased from USD 33 bill in 1995 to USD 666 bill in 
2008 (Global Private Equity Report 2011 by Bain & Company)  
3
 An outstanding example is NBIM considering investments in private equity according to the 
strategy plan for 2011-2013 http://www.nbim.no/en/About-us/nbim-organisation/nbim-
governance/strategy-plan-2011-2013-/ 
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flow needs, while general partners would seek to sell the assets in case of the lack 
of management capacity (partner talent is limited), insufficient capital for follow-
on funding or unavailability of other exit opportunities, as well as to realize 
greater IRR.  The buyers are attracted by the opportunity to enter the fund at the 
later stage of its life, which promises a faster return on their investment, and also 
possibility to track the performance of the fund.  Understanding the factors driving 
private equity funds performance is crucial for secondary investors during the 
selection process.  Thus identifying these factors constitutes the main aspiration of 
our research. 
The Nordic secondary private equity market has experienced similar dynamics 
to the global.  According to Thomson Reuters, the number of Nordic trade sales 
and secondary buyouts has increased over the last decade as did the number of all 
private equity deals. In fact, the percentage of secondary deals among all the deals 
has grown from 31% in 2000 (28 deals) to 42% in 2010 (84 deals).  Preqin, the 
leading provider of data and intelligence on alternative assets industry, reports that 
there are currently 61 investors located in the Nordic region that are considering 
the possibility of purchasing private equity or real estate fund stakes on 
the secondary market within the next 24 months. On the seller side, there are 
currently 26 investors based in the Nordic region that are potentially looking to 
sell private equity or real estate fund interests.  
Given such developments in the global and Nordic private equity market, we 
see the secondary PE market as an exciting area of research, and therefore 
concentrate our efforts in studying the private equity industry on the fund level, 
i.e. we aggregate the data on portfolio companies belonging to the same fund. 
1.1 Contribution 
In our research, we use a comprehensive dataset (described below), obtained 
from a private source, and not analyzed before.  The main research problem of 
this thesis is to identify and explore the factors driving Nordic private equity 
funds’ performance and estimate their effect on the funds’ excess returns.  
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2. Introductory Review of Previous PE Studies 
The literature on private equity investments can be divided into two sets: the 
one focusing on performance of individual venture capital investments and the 
other focusing on funds rather than the separate investment projects and including 
buyout investments.  We are interested in the latter category since we concentrate 
our attention on various funds’ performance. 
2.1 Performance Measurement  
In our research, we face the problem of adequate measurement of the fund 
performance. This question was addressed in a number of papers; Gompers and 
Lerner (1997) is a pioneering work, describing the calculation of risk-adjusted 
fund returns (i.e. performance alpha).  This issue is also addressed in Ljungqvist 
and Richardson (2003) and Kaplan and Schoar (2005).  Phalippou  and Zollo 
(2006) take a different approach to fund performance estimation by making 
several adjustments (like corrections for sample selection bias and “living dead” 
investments) to the previously used value-weighted average performance 
approach.  Further discussion of the relevant measurements of the fund 
performance follows in Section 4.1 Independent Variable. 
2.2 Determinants of Fund Performances 
The results of previous works are used to identify the probable drivers of the 
fund performance.  In Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003), the fund size, a dummy 
variable for first-time funds, the portfolio beta, measures of portfolio 
diversification, vintage year, amount of committed capital, fund life, cost of funds, 
availability of investment opportunities and competition among private equity 
funds are explored as the determining factors of the PE funds performance.  Jones 
and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) examine how the principal-agent problem impacts the 
fund returns.  Lopez de Silanes, Phalippou  and Gottschalg (2010) include several 
other variables pertaining to PE firm’s scale and scope (controls for firm-specific 
structure, firm’s age etc.). We elaborate more on the factors of fund performance 
that might be of interest for our research in Section 4.2 Dependent Variables.  
2.3 Agency Problem in Private Equity setting 
One characteristic that crucially differentiates private equity investors from 
public market investors is the active ownership of the former. Therefore, we wish 
to draw particular attention to this issue.  The concept of active ownership, or a 
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hands-on management style, means a high degree of involvement in portfolio 
companies.  In its core, the phenomenon of active ownership in private equity 
industry is closely tied to the principal-agent interaction.  Evidently, primary 
problems arising in the principal-agent relationship are information asymmetry 
(hidden information) and moral hazard (hidden action) (Pratt  and Zeckhauser, 
1985).   
To elaborate, private equity funds are managed by General Partners (GP), 
while investors in the funds are Limited Partners (LP).   Thus active ownership is 
a governance mechanism used to mitigate agency problem between GP and target 
firm management.   This agency level has been covered widely in research and 
was identified as a genuine value driver in private equity (Heel and Kehoe 2005). 
In this study, the details of 60 PE deals from 11 PE companies (defined by authors 
as leading) are investigated.  Company outperformance relative to industry peers 
is said to be the primary source of value creation (accounting for 63% of it).  
Hence, it is concluded that PE firms create value through improving the 
companies they invest in.  Authors name five common features that characterize 
the top performers.  First, the top deal partners seek out expertise before making 
investments.  Second, the substantial and focused performance incentives are 
employed (we elaborate more on this issue below).  Third, they craft a more 
elaborate value creation plans, together with a rigid set of key performance 
indicators.  Fourth, they devote more hours to managing their investments.  Fifth, 
the management is replaced early in the life of a deal by the more successful deal 
partners.   
However, we are concerned with performance determinants of the fund on 
aggregate.  On this level GP are subject to a different kind of principal-agent 
problem, with LP's as principal and GP as an agent.   To assure sufficient effort 
from GP at maximizing fund's value, limited partnership contracts are designed to 
combat principal-agent problem in PE setting.   Thus, in the framework of our 
research, we are interested in contractual compensation structure and peculiar 
covenants of limited partnership agreement.  More in detail, we examine the 
impact of principal-agent problem between LP and GP on PE funds performance. 
 To be more precise, we want to relate the performance to incentives provided 
within limited partnership contracts, which are the dominant organizational form 
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worldwide in PE industry (Gompers  and Lerner, 1997) (and in case of our dataset 
too).   
Further data assessment is needed to distil variables that signal contractual 
incentives.   There could be a different contractual balance between fixed fund-
size proportional fee and performance-based fee, charged by GP.  We would be 
interested to compare performance results of funds with different contractual 
compensation structures.  For the sake of example,  some contracts in our dataset 
include carry fee by GP, which implies that manager has a claim to certain share 
of profits should they exceed predetermined level (hurdle rate). 
3. Model and Variables  9 
 
3. Model and Variables 
In short, our aim is to create a multivariate model which can describe relations 
between fund performance and defined factors in conceptual form of: 
  Fund Performance =                 
Now, we proceed with defining dependant variable and independent factors 
expected to determine it. 
3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in our model is the private equity fund performance. 
However, there is an ambiguity of how it can be measured. 
The basic measures of the private equity performance at the fund level are the 
internal rate of return (IRR), profitability index (PI) and the public market 
equivalent (PME) and return multiples (cash on cash ratios, e.g. total value to 
paid-in capital – TVPI).  Each of these measures has some advantages and 
drawbacks, and previous studies have indicated that regression results are 
sensitive to the performance measure used.  At the same time, it was shown that 
different private equity funds performance measures are highly correlated 
empirically (Kaplan  and Schoar, 2005). 
The internal rate of return (IRR) is the prevalent measure in the industry. The 
IRR of an investment is defined as any rate which equates the present value of the 
cash outflows and inflows associated with the investment. This is the rate of 
return that is earned from the investment (Copeland et al. 2005, 28). However, it 
has three important pitfalls: it tends to favour shorter-term funds, there is no 
standard method to calculate this measure which can potentially lead to different 
results and the IRR fails to take into account various fund characteristics (i.e. risk 
profile) (Gompers  and Lerner, 2003). 
The profitability index (PI) is a measure based on the net present value (NPV) 
and it is defined as the net present value of cash flows over the initial investment.  
The PI addresses several of the problems present in the IRR measure. The central 
question is the discount rate to be used. 
Arguably, the public market equivalent (PME) is more meaningful for the 
limited partners since it is the PI which compares an investment in a private equity 
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fund to an investment in the public market (by discounting all the cash flows at 
the return to some public market index).   The selection of the proper benchmark 
is thus crucial. 
The cash on cash ratios, also known as the money multiples or TVPI ratios, use 
the simplest approach to measuring fund performance and therefore are the most 
common metric used in the private equity industry.  These multiples are the ratios 
of distributed and yet undistributed portfolio value to the initially invested capital. 
The main advantage of the return multiples is their simplicity, but the drawback is 
that they completely ignore the notion of the time value of money. 
In our thesis, we use only IRR and TVPI metrics to proxy for performance due 
to the complications connected with calculations of PI and PME, which are 
discussed in the following subsection.  We assume all of the performance metrics 
to be highly correlated, and hence, find two of them sufficient for the cross-check 
of the results. 
3.1.1. Risk associated with investments in private equity funds 
When measuring performance of private equity funds using PI or PME metrics, 
we should consider the relevant risk of such investments.  The challenge of 
measuring the risk of private equity as an asset class was mentioned in several 
academic works.  There is no unified view on this problem and a number of 
approaches for addressing the risk of the private equity funds have been 
developed.  
The pioneering study in this field was conducted by Gompers and Lerner in 
1997. This work examines the risk-adjusted performance of a single fund group 
by marking-to-market each investment quarterly.  The obtained time series of 
portfolio value is regressed on various pricing factors, giving a performance alpha, 
which was found to be positive and significant. 
The more recent approach is the one developed by Ljungqvist and Richardson 
(2003).  To estimate the risk of each private equity fund, they suggest assigning 
the risk (beta in this case) to each portfolio company.  Using the capital 
disbursements as weights, the average equity beta of the fund is calculated. 
In our research, we avoid the problem of selecting the appropriate risk level for 
the private equity investments since the IRR and TVPI metrics do not require a 
discount rate as an input. 
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3.2 Independent Variables 
Having researched literature on determining sources of PE funds performance, 
we singled out three broad areas of possible factors to test: characteristics of the 
fund itself, competence of GP and GP/LP relationship within limited partnership. 
Fund Characteristics  
The first area of fund characteristics encompasses numerous determinants, such 
as fund size and specialization:  
Size 
Fund size can alter performance through economies of scale effects, but 
previous studies documented diverse forms of correlation.  Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005) have found relationship to be concave in cross-section, but negative for 
individual GP’s.   Concavity can be attributed to limited availability of profitable 
deals, which becomes more evident when fund grows beyond certain threshold.  
Moreover, authors argue concavity of the PE production function to also be the 
cause, as managerial skills require time consumption. Phalippou and Gottschalg 
(2009) on the other hand have found the relationship to be positive and linear.   
We measure fund size by the total amount of capital committed to it.  As 
previous studies showed contradicting results, we expect size to have either 
negative or positive correlation with performance.  
Vesting period 
Vesting period is contractually specified investment horizon of the fund 
measured in months.  Vesting period of the fund determines performance in a 
number of ways, namely in terms of investment and managing decisions 
timeframe.  It also alters the GP’s target return rate to compensate for illiquidity.  
According to the views in the existing literature, this relationship is expected to be 
negative.  
Specialization 
Specialization is wide set of characteristics of the funds which focus on certain 
dimensions.  Among those dimensions most prominent are geographic 
specialization, industrial specialization and stage specialization (VC vs. buyout).  
Specialization determines how narrow the focus is within one or couple of those 
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dimensions.  Overall, studies have revealed narrow industrial focus and early 
stage specialization to have positive correlation with performance   (De Clercq 
2003).  Narrow geographic focus was found to have negative correlation with 
performance by Manigart  et al. (1994), although positive correlation might be 
expected due to local network effects.  Competing effects of the specialization are 
negative impact from loss of diversification and benefit of focused skills and 
knowledge accumulation, which are “hard to imitate” as postulated by Manigart  
et al (2002).   
Stage specialization is measured as dummy variable taking value of 1 for VC 
specialized funds and zero otherwise. Positive correlation is expected.  
Industrial specialization is represented by the dummy variable, where 1 
indicates the presence of the distinctive industrial focus as defined by the fund 
itself and 0 – the absence of such. Expected variable sign for industrial 
specialization is positive.  
We measure geographic specialization by the number from 1 to 5 which 
reflects the degree of the geographical specialization. The scale is as follows: 
 
Value Scope 
1  Single country 
2  Nordics 
3  Northern Europe 
4  Europe 
5  Global 
 
Expected sign for geographical specialization variable is positive, i.e. positive 
correlation between the fund returns and broader geographical focus. 
GP Characteristics 
Second broad area is characteristics of GP with respect to their competence, 
knowledge and skills, which could be proxied by performance persistence and 
fund sequence: 
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GP Persistence  
Persistence outlines continuity of GP in generating returns, or in other words 
how much current fund performance is determined by previously managed funds 
results. It is expected that such continuity will signal of GP skills development 
and experience accumulation.  Kaplan  and Schoar (2005) find economically and 
statistically significant persistence in PE funds performance even for funds two 
lags apart.   Phalippou  and Gottschalg (2009) support this argument as well by 
showing that current fund is most likely to perform in the same tercile 
(performance band) as GP’s previous fund.  
In our approach, measuring persistence involves regressing focus fund 
performance on lagged values of performance measures for previous funds run by 
corresponding GP.  Positive correlation is expected.   
Sequence 
Sequence is the order of the fund raised by GP.  In general, it is characteristic 
both of the fund and GP.  However, we have chosen to attribute it to GP, as higher 
sequence is another signal of previous success and managing reputation.    Both 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) document 
positive correlation between sequence and performance. Nevertheless, well 
performing GP has higher chance of raising next fund, which triggers survivorship 
bias to control for. 
Obvious ordinal measurement for the variable is the chronological ranking of 
the focus fund in GP’s managerial history and positive sign is predicted by 
research.  
Principal-Agent Relationship Characteristics 
The last set of determinants comes from the principal-agent relationship 
between LP and GP, aimed at reducing agency costs and incentivizing GP’s 
managing performance.  Such determinants outline the mechanisms of corporate 
governance within the fund, and we chose most quantifiable measures – GP 
capital commitment, management fee, GP’s profits carry (allocation of gains from 
investments) and number of funds managed simultaneously. 
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GP Capital commitment 
Capital committed by GP to invest in the fund provides incentive to maximize 
funds value and hence returns, of which GP retains share proportional to 
commitment.  We would expect GP to perform better when more of their capital is 
at stake.  Thus, we measure GP commitment as a percentage share in total fund 
commitments and expect positive sign if this incentivisation mechanism if 
effective.  
Managerial fee 
Management fee is performance-independent part of compensation, and thus 
might provide insufficient incentive if too high.  Number of issues arises and 
suggests fee level should be tested with respect to level and possibly fee 
composition, whether it is fixed or proportional.  Fixed fee might provide 
insufficient compensation for large funds.  Still, proportional fee could induce GP 
to inflate fund size beyond scope of investment opportunities on the market.     
Managerial fee variable is measured in percentage relative to total funds 
committed with positive expected sign.  In addition, we include dummy variable 
fee rigidity to reflect whether fee is fixed on level or proportional (1=fixed, 0 
otherwise) with expected sign undetermined due to contradicting incentive forces.   
Carry interest 
Carry interest is profit share of GP’s when profits surpass a determined 
percentage level (hurdle).  Thus, this is the most refined compensation 
mechanism, as it provides incentive to grow and a benchmark to achieve.  
Potential conflict of interest might arise, e.g. when GP chasing to bypass high 
benchmark hurdle allocates money to inappropriately high-risk investments. 
Therefore, we include both hurdle percentage and a profit sharing percentage 
as our measurements of these independent variables (since they proxy for 
conflicting incentives and hazards).   Hurdle is expected to correlate either 
negatively or positively with performance, while profit share is predicted to have 
positive correlation.  
In addition to testing levels of carry interest, it is sensible to test structure of 
realized fees, i.e. share of GP’s carry profit in their total returns.  Metrick  and 
Yasuda (2010) have found that 2/3 of revenues by GP are earned as fixed 
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management fees, which might suggest weakened link between performance and 
GP reward (Chung  et al. 2011).  We examine this peculiar relationship in 
descriptive statistics.  
Simultaneous management 
Number of funds managed at one time creates potential conflict of interest 
across those funds.  As outlined by Baks  and Benveniste (2010), simultaneous 
involvement of GPs in several funds might lead to suboptimal management, such 
as focusing on high-performance fund and disregarding sinking one, engaging in 
as many funds as possible to collect more fees, simultaneous involvement in one 
investment project by means of two funds (e.g. by investing in different securities 
types)  etc.  All in all, simultaneous management by GPs requires testing for 
adverse incentives effects on performance.   Therefore, we measure this variable 
by number of funds measured with focused fund and generally expect negative 
sign.   
3.3 Model Setup 
As described in Section 4.1, the fund’s performance is the dependent variable 
in our model.  Practically, it is represented by two measures: IRR and TVPI.  We 
use both of them in the empirical part of our research to capture any sensitivities 
arising from the specifics of the performance metric used.  Hence, the dependent 
variable will have the values of Y1: Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Y2: Total 
Value to Paid-In capital (TVPI). 
Subsequently, our research goal is to test the effects of three sets of factors 
described in part 4.2 on Nordic PE funds performance.  Those factors have either 
been proven by previous studies to demonstrate significant correlation with 
performance, or are expected to have impact by our theoretical setup (as in case 
with governance mechanisms).   Tests are conducted both on univariate and 
multivariate levels to control for adverse effects and verify robustness.   
We generalize our testable model in the following multivariate regression: 
   
                                                           
                                                             
                                                         
                                                        
                                             
 
The model is summarized in the table 1 below. 
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Table 1. Summary of the specified model. 
 
Theoretical variable Empirical proxy Expected sign 
Size TCC*/ln(TCC) + or - 
Vesting period Fund contractual  horizon, months - 
Specialization:   
- stage VC/Buyout dummy + 
- industrial Dummy + 
- geographical Scale from 1 to 5 + 
GP persistence Lagged performance of n previous GP funds + 
Sequence Chronological order of fund in GP track record + 
GP Capital committed GP cap. comm.  proportional to TCC + 
Managerial fee Fee level proportional to TCC + 
Fee rigidity Fixed/proportional dummy + or - 
Carry hurdle Hurdle profit rate to surpass + or - 
Carry profit Profit share of GP above hurdle + 
Simultaneous management Number of funds managed simultaneously - 
 
* Total capital committed
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4. Dataset Description 
Our main sources for collecting data are Private Placement Memoranda (PPM), 
Limited Partnership Agreements (LPA) and investor reports over various time 
spans (quarterly and annual).  Cubera AS
4
 provided us with proprietary data of 
funds from mid-90’s and up to the most recent.  Data came both in printed and 
digitalized formats.  In addition, we were provided with cash flow data for 
selected funds.  All aforementioned resources are private and confidential, hence 
require NDA compliance.  Furthermore, we utilized private equity database 
Eureka Hedge, press releases and other online resources.   
PPM is issued upon fund commencement to inform and attract potential 
investors. It defines key terms of the fund itself, commitment covenants and 
remuneration schedule for the parties.  In addition it presents GP’s track record 
and investment policy.   LPA is a legally binding document, which solidifies 
conditions stated in PPM as an official agreement.  Reports are distributed to 
investors within defined time intervals and present current fund status and 
performance.  Fund reporting is not standardized, and thus provides varying 
degree of scope and details. 
Resulting sample comprises of 52 private equity funds with operations in the 
Nordic region.  Nordic region is defined as area covering Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland.  Sample funds have their investment advisor office and/or 
business operations located in at least one of those countries.  For tax purposes 
most of the funds are registered in tax havens, predominantly Channel Islands.  
We proceed with providing descriptive analysis of the sample.   Some fund 
features are not reported by all the managing partnerships, and for those variables 
there are cases with missing data in our sample
5
.  To be consistent we firstly 
describe sample characteristics within three broad areas as defined in section 4: 
fund characteristics, GP characteristics and principal-agent relationship 
characteristics.  We then describe the dependent variable of fund performance.  
 
                                                 
4
 Cubera Private Equity AS is a secondary private equity firm operating in Nordic market. 
http://www.cubera.no/ 
5
 Only limited number of observations could be collected for GP persistence variable, thus we 
exclude it from further regression analysis. 
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4.1 Fund Characteristics 
Size 
  
Sample 
size Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Min. Max. 
Size, EUR mn 49 612.47 256.00 985.19 14.00 4750.00 
 
49 funds have reported their realized size in terms of total capital commitments 
from investors, which we have standardized to single Euro currency (EUR).  Fund 
size ranges from EUR 14mn to EUR 4.75bn.  With mean of EUR 612.47mn being 
much higher than the median size of EUR 256mn we conclude that few large 
funds cause fund size distribution to be skewed to the right.    
In addition to realized size, PPM presents target size which partners expect to 
raise.  Of 31 funds reporting their targets, 9 fell short of them.  
Vintage year 
 
Figure 1: Sample funds distribution by vintage year 
All 52 funds in the sample have been classified by their vintage year, with 
frequency distribution presented in Figure 1.  Funds have been raised in 1997 and 
between 2000-2011, with most in 2005 and 2008.  Funds with vintage year 5 
years ago or less are likely to have made few to no exits up to date and thus 
distributed less proceeds to GPs. Hence performance measure for such funds is 
either based on subjective valuation of their residual portfolio or not reported at 
all, which could put certain constraints on our dependant variable. 
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Vesting period 
  
Figure 2: Sample funds distribution by vesting and extension cap 
Another important feature of the fund is the vesting period, which defines the 
contractual lifetime of the partnership.  In addition, LPA leaves the option of 
extension of the fund life by predefined increments.  Both characteristics are 
presented as distributions in Figure 2.  Majority of the funds are vested for 10 
years, with other occurrences being 7, 8 and 12 years.  Also, most funds could be 
extended for up to 2 years.      
 
However, we must note that vesting period albeit contractually binding is not 
an indicator of realized fund lifetime, but more of a target investment horizon.  
Some funds having sold most of their investments can be trapped with a single 
portfolio company not able to locate an exit opportunity.  Thus, they continue to 
remain de-jure active long past their maximal extension, although effectively they 
can be considered terminated. This could be the case for partnerships, where 
distribution in specie (i.e. in equity) is restrained.  
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Termination status 
 
Figure 3: Funds by termination status 
Continuing the case above, we describe the funds termination status in Figure 
3.  Consequently, 48 or 92% of the funds remain active, meaning that at least one 
portfolio company is still under GP’s management.  As mentioned before, when 
calculating aggregated performance measure for such funds we must include 
unrealized residual value in addition to distributions from realization.   
Specialization 
 
Figure 4: Funds by geographical focus 
Now we proceed to analyzing funds by their postulated investment strategy, 
beginning with geographical scope.  Each GP commits to limit the location for 
investments to certain area, and we have developed a simplified scale to capture 
the degree of such geographical specialization.  The scale, together with 
distribution, is presented in Figure 4.  To clarify, Northern Europe in addition to 
Nordics includes countries surrounding the Baltic Sea, Austria, Switzerland and 
UK.   
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As observed in the histogram, 27 funds commit to limit their investment area to 
Nordics, while one single fund pursued pan-European scope.  Overall, geographic 
specialization is prevalent in our sample, with just 9 funds choosing to encompass 
global equity market.  
 
 
Figure 5: Funds by industrial and stage  focus 
Due to wide scope and overlapping classifications of the reported industrial 
strategies, which are impractical to quantify, we consider it prudent to analyze 
sample by presence of industrial focus. Figure 5 presents the distribution of funds 
by industrial focus, which suggests that a third of 52 sampled funds limit their 
investments by industry.   Common areas of specialization include technology 
(IT, communication, industrial), medical industries and energy (oil and gas).   
Possible reason for lower extent of industrial specialization might stem from the 
need for diversification from geographically focused funds.  This is further 
demonstrated in correlation matrix between those variables.  
 
Also in Figure 5 we present distribution by the stage of investment, with only 
11 out of 52 funds specializing on venture capital (usually defined in contracts as 
early stage investment focus).  VC funds tend to be smaller in size, distributed to 
the left of the mean with largest fund having EUR 339.6 mill commitments.  
 
All in all, our sample is composed of mostly active PE funds with prevailing 
Nordic specialization, which typically invest in diverse industries.  They mainly 
engage in buyout transactions and are vested for around 10 years.    
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4.2 GP Characteristics 
Fund sequence 
We continue to classify sample funds with characteristics, which are deemed to 
proxy for the GP’s skills and competence.   
 
Figure 6: Funds distribution by raising sequence 
 
As described before, sequence in which the fund is raised shall signal of GP 
managerial talent perceived by investors, who choose to commit cash for each 
consecutive vintage.  Our sample distribution by sequence is summarized in 
Figure 6, which suggests most funds are in 2
nd
-4
th
 sequential succession for their 
managers.  8 funds are raised by the managing team for the first time.  Smaller 
incidence of funds with sequence 6 or higher can be attributed to relatively recent 
boost of PE industry in Nordics and long-term nature of investment.   
4.3 Principal-Agent Relationship Characteristics 
The final set of descriptive data encompasses the features of PE contracts, 
which are relevant to managerial effort exerted by GP.  
Capital commitment 
  
Sample 
size Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Min. Max. 
Capital 
commitment 
by GP, % 
38 2.35 1.17 2.68 0.00 13.50 
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As seen from table above, GP commitment share in the fund ranges from 0% to 
13.5%, with 2.35% in mean.   
Compensation structure 
  
Sample 
 size Mean Median 
Standard  
Deviation Min. Max. t-value p-value 
Management 
Fee 
46 2.06 2.00 0.33 1.50 3.00 1.3055 0.1984 
Carry 
Interest 
47 19.79 20.00 1.20 12.00 20.00 -1.2189 0.2291 
Hurdle Rate 44 7.61 8.00 0.99 4.00 8.00 -2.5799 0.0134 
The next table presents descriptive statistics of the compensation parts.  The 
median management fee is 2% of compensation, and to receive median carry 
interest of 20% GP must surpass on median a hurdle return of 8%.  Those values 
are used most frequently in contracts.  Hence, we test if they can be considered a 
population mean for respective variables.  We cannot reject the hypothesis of 
them being a mean for management fee and carry interest based on p-value at 5% 
significance level, but we can reject the null hypothesis for the hurdle rate, 
meaning that the mean hurdle rate can be different from 8% in the population.  In 
our sample, managerial fee was always set proportionally to the total capital 
committed, hence, there is no need in the fee rigidity variable, which we specified 
above. 
Simultaneous management 
 
Figure 7: Funds distribution by simultaneous management 
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Finally we study the number of funds management simultaneously with the one 
in consideration.  Figure 7 suggests most GPs manage 3 funds, while the common 
number falls in bracket 2-4.  Only one out of 49 sampled GPs concentrates on 
single fund.   
 
4.4 Fund performance 
We acquired two fund performance measures: IRR for the sample of 29 funds 
and TVPI for the sample of 38 funds.   
 
The mean IRR is 17% with median around 11%.  Based on p-value test we can 
reject the hypothesis of reference IRR of 0% to be the population mean.  
 
TVPI, also known as multiple on cash (MOC) is performance valuation used 
more frequently and therefore reported more often.  GP’s on average multiplied 
their managed commitments by a factor of 1.68, with maximum being 6 times the 
investment.   
As mentioned above, the two performance metrics are expected to be highly 
related.  Indeed, the correlation coefficient between the IRR and TVPI calculated 
from their intersection set is 0.91 and significant at 5%.  This result allows us to 
use the two performance measures interchangeably.   
Now we proceed to study how these performance measures of the funds are 
influenced by independent factors.  
  
Sample 
 size Mean Median 
Standard  
Deviation Min. Max. t-value p-value 
IRR 29 0.17 0.11 0.22 -0.13 0.81 4.23 0.00 
  
Sample 
size Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Min. Max. 
TVPI 38 1.68 1.35 1.08 0.46 6.00 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
We commence the empirical part of the research by studying correlation 
between variables for samples with IRR and TVPI as performance measures. 
Results are presented in the respective matrices in the tables 2 and 3 below. 
As highlighted in the subsequent section, some dependent variables have been 
excluded from the regression analysis due to lack in variability or insufficient 
number of observations.  Therefore, we omit them in correlation matrix as well.  
In IRR sample, fund size is significantly positively correlated with vesting 
period and stage specialization.  Thus, GP tends to attract more commitments for 
longer vested and buyout funds.   Also, geographical specialization measure is 
highly positively correlated with industrial focus, which for the inverted scale 
used means those factors are negatively related. This relation is expected in the 
light of aforementioned need for diversification.  We also observe negative 
correlation between buyout (stage) specialization and geographical/industrial 
focus.  Hence buyout funds are likely to be less industrially bound, but more 
geographically focused than VC. Hence local expertise appears to be more vital 
for buyout funds than industrial.  Finally, we detect strong positive correlation 
between simultaneous management and sequence. This finding is straightforward, 
since each new fund contributes to management simultaneity.   
 
We get quite similar results for the TVPI sample matrix. Additional findings 
include negative correlation between size and the managerial fee, implying larger 
funds to provide less fixed compensation. Since total compensation increases 
proportionally with size due to carry profit, this relation is intuitive.  Also, vesting 
period is positively correlated with stage specialization, meaning that buyout 
funds have longer lifetime.  Yet again we observe strong positive correlation 
between simultaneous management and sequence. 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix, IRR sample.  
Notes: Bold print indicates correlations that are significant at the 5 percent level. Some variables were omitted due to the lack of the variability in the data or too few 
observations. 
  
IRR Size Vesting 
Geo. 
spec. 
Industr. 
spec. 
Stage 
spec. 
Sequence Mngrl. fee Carry profit Simult.  
IRR 1           
 
      
Size -0.39 1     
 
    
Vesting -0.47 0.46 1    
 
    
Geo. spec. 0.10 0.00 -0.22 1   
 
    
Industr. spec. 0.16 -0.39 -0.26 0.84 1  
 
    
Stage spec. -0.28 0.43 0.40 -0.55 -0.65 1 
 
    
Sequence -0.24 0.29 0.19 0.07 -0.07 0.16 
1 
    
Mngrl. fee -0.13 -0.39 -0.28 0.27 0.35 -0.39 
-0.25 1    
Carry profit 0.09 0.05 0.08 -0.09 0.04 0.05 
0.14 -0.17 1  
Simult. 
-0.08 0.12 0.03 0.07 -0.05 -0.07 
0.91 
-0.09 0.07 
1 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix, TVPI sample.  
Notes: Bold print indicates correlations that are significant at the 5 percent level. Some variables were omitted due to the lack of the variability in the data or too few 
observations. 
  
TVPI Size Vesting Geo. spec. 
Industr. 
spec. 
Stage 
spec. 
Sequence Mngrl. fee 
Carry 
profit 
Simult. 
TVPI 1          
Size -0.54 1         
Vesting -0.71 0.34 1        
Geo. spec. 0.29 0.05 -0.22 1       
Industr. spec. 0.38 -0.34 -0.27 0.83 1      
Stage spec. -0.60 0.33 0.40 -0.55 -0.67 1     
Sequence -0.33 0.33 0.17 0.06 -0.09 0.15 1    
Mngrl. fee 0.09 -0.44 -0.16 0.06 0.18 -0.22 -0.08 1   
Carry profit 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.10 -0.06 0.13 -0.01 1  
Simult. 
-0.07 0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.89 0.11 0.08 
1 
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5.1 Regressions 
We carry on with running multiple regressions for both datasets with IRR and 
TVPI as performance measures.  Variables demonstrating low variability or lack 
of observations have been excluded from the panel.  
6.1.1. Multivariate linear regression – base case model 
   
                                                                 
                                                                
                                                     
                                                      
                           
    
For both panel regressions, managerial fee is significant coefficient at 5% level 
with considerably negative estimated effect on the performance.  In addition, 
TVPI panel yielded more significant estimates.   Vesting period is negatively 
related to performance with high 1% level of significance, meaning that longer 
vested funds tend to perform worse.  Size has negative impact of TVPI as well 
with 5 % significance level.  Geographical specialization variable (inverted in our 
case) is positively related to the performance at marginal 10% level of 
significance.  Consequently wider regional scope of investment is related to 
higher performance.  Increasing sequence of the fund is associated with lower 
TVPI at 5% significance level. Lastly, TVPI increases significantly (at 5%) in 
simultaneous management variable.  Adjusted R-squared suggests that TVPI 
panel explains 74% in performance variance, which is a high value and signals of 
good fit.  For IRR dataset only 28% of variance in dependant variable around its 
mean is explained by specified model.  
The obtained adjusted R-squared of 74% indicates a very high explanatory 
power.  We should be careful with over-interpreting it, since the limited size of 
the sample combined with the high number of explanatory variables, and hence, 
lower degrees of freedom, might cause a certain degree of over-fitting in the 
model.  This does not, however, disqualify our results, since our main interest lies 
in the signs of the coefficients, which allows studying the interaction between the 
fund  
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Table 4. Multivariate linear regression, base case model. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. Some variables were omitted in the regressions due to the lack 
of the variability in the data or too few observations.  
 
Independent variable 
  
Dependent variable 
 Net IRR6   TVPI   
Constant 
2.62 ** 14.77 *** 
(1.21)  (3.67)  
Size  
-0.09  -0.37 ** 
(0.06)  (0.18)  
Vesting period 
-0.00  -0.05 *** 
(0.00)  (0.01)  
Specialization:     
-stage 
0.09  -0.57  
(0.18)  (0.54)  
-industrial 
-0.16  -0.85  
(0.24)  (0.74)  
-geographical 
0.08  0.33 * 
(0.06)  (0.18)  
Sequence 
-0.07  -0.26 ** 
(0.04)  (0.11)  
GP Capital committed 
n/a  n/a  
n/a  n/a  
Managerial fee 
-0.50 ** -0.99 ** 
(0.20)  (0.38)  
Carry profit 
0.02  0.08  
(0.02)  (0.07)  
Carry hurdle 
n/a  n/a  
n/a  n/a  
Simultaneous management 
0.07  0.28 ** 
(0.05)  (0.13)  
     
Multiple R-squared 0.76  0.91   
Adjusted R-squared 0.28  0.74   
F-test 1.95  9.84  
Sample size 23   29    
                                                 
6
 Net IRR is calculated based on the cash flows after fees 
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performance and its determinants, rather than in the overall goodness of fit of the 
suggested model. 
The key economic implications of those findings are interpreted in the 
upcoming subsection.   
 
5.1.2. OLS assumptions 
An important step in the econometric analysis is to ensure that the general 
assumptions of the Ordinary Least Squares method hold.  Only this can guarantee 
the valid results and BLUE
7
 estimates. 
One of the basic assumptions under the OLS model is the constant variance of 
residuals, or no heteroscedasticity.  The usual method of detection if this 
assumption holds is a visual inspection of the graph of residuals.  In our case, 
there is no pattern in the scatter plot of residuals versus the dependent variable, so 
it is not possible to identify any signs of heteroscedasticity from a visual 
inspection (Appendices A and B).   
Residuals of the regression should not be autocorrelated, or in other words, 
should be time-independent.  Since our sample consists of a cross-section and not 
time series, the autocorrelation problem cannot arise. 
The OLS requires no perfect multicollinearity in the data.  Multicollinearity 
problem might be present if several independent variables are closely correlated 
with each other.  As the correlation matrix of the independent variables shows, 
there are several pairs of variables in our sample that have a high degree of 
correlation (e.g. sequence of the fund and simultaneous management).  However, 
the standard errors of the independent variables tend to be inflated in the presence 
of multicollinearity, which reduces the t-statistic and causes these variables to be 
statistically insignificant.  We do not experience this effect in our regression: both 
sequence of the fund and simultaneity variables are statistically significant. 
Moreover, as presented further in the section on robustness of the results, these 
variables are statistically significant only if the other variable is present in the 
regression equation.  This indicates that the variables are likely to contain 
different information and none of them is redundant.  Therefore, even if present, 
                                                 
7
 BLUE = Best Linear Unbiased Estimator 
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the degree of multicollinearity in our model is acceptable.  We see no reason to 
omit any of the specified variables from the regression, as it might cause the 
omitted variable bias, which is much graver than the effects of multicollinearity. 
For the validity of the statistical inference, the distribution of the residuals 
should be close to the normal distribution.  This can be checked by inspecting the 
histogram of the residuals (Appendices C and D). In our case, the distributions of 
the residuals from the two regressions are reasonably close to the normal curve. 
All in all, there are no distinguishable patterns in the residuals, which makes us 
believe the omitted variable bias is not present and the model was specified 
correctly.  There are no indications that any of OLS assumptions are violated.  A 
high R-squared and F-test indicate the validity of the model. 
 
5.2 Main economic implications 
The table 5 below presents the comparison of the predicted signs of the 
variables with the realized signs from the multivariate regression described in the 
previous section.  The comparison is not available for variables that were not 
included in the regression equation (GP capital commitment and Carry hurdle) 
and those which exhibit no statistical significance (Stage and industrial 
specialization and Carry profit). 
The previous studies have shown the contradicting result as for the relationship 
between the size of the fund and its performance.  Our results show that in our 
sample, the correlation is negative.  This can be explained by the diminishing 
return to scale: it is harder to find profitable deals for the large funds as the 
investment opportunities at the given point in time are limited, and the attention of 
the team is more dispersed.  
The predicted and realized sign of the vesting period is negative.  Technically, 
the longer the timeframe before a particular exit, the lower the returns as the 
implication of the basic time value of money principle, since the same cash flows 
are discounted more heavily.  Also, in practice, the most successful and profitable 
company exits happen early in the life of the fund, as there is a strong incentive 
for the fund managers to realize successful investments sooner than later as the 
business environment might change in the future.  This negative relationship can 
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also be connected to the differences between the venture capital and buyout funds: 
for venture capital, vesting period is typically lower, and returns are expected to 
be higher than for buyout funds to compensate for the higher risk.  
The obtained results do not provide a clear result as for the relationship 
between the stage specialization of the fund (VC vs. buyout) and its returns – this 
variable is statistically insignificant.  We believe this reflects the uneven 
distribution between the VC and buyout fund in our sample: only about 10 funds 
in our sample can be considered such which focus on early-stage and seed 
financing.  The previous part (Descriptive statistics) points out the strongly 
skewed distribution of the size of the funds, with the right tail of the distribution 
(medium to large funds) significantly overweighting the left tail.  Therefore, we 
contribute the insignificance of the stage specialization dummy to the small 
amount of the VC funds compared to buyout funds in our sample.   
The regression does not prove the industry specialization variable to be 
significant.  This can be interpreted as the absence of the direct link between the 
industrial specialization and the performance of the fund: the success of the 
industrially focused versus opportunistic funds depends on other variables. 
It is clear from the results of our multivariate regressions that the geographical 
specialization negatively correlates with the potential higher returns of the private 
equity funds.  This is consisted with the previous studies.  The positive sign arises 
due to the fact that in our methodology, the geographical specialization index 
increases in larger geographical exposure, which is equivalent to lower 
geographical specialization.  The likely explanation of this effect is the decreased 
number of the attractive deals available to the fund given the narrow geographical 
focus.  However, we should be cautious with this result as our sample is biased 
towards the funds that focus on Nordics solely. 
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Table 5. Variables with predicted and realized sign 
 
Theoretical variable   
Predicted 
sign 
  Realized sign  
Size  + or -  - 
Vesting period  -  - 
Specialization:     
-stage  +  insignificant 
-industrial  +  insignificant 
-geographical  +  + 
Sequence  +  - 
GP Capital commitment  +  n/a 
Managerial fee  +  - 
Carry profit  +  insignificant 
Carry hurdle  + or -  n/a 
Simultaneous management   -   + 
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Both regressions, based on Net IRR and TVPI, unanimously yielded the 
negative sign for the sequence of the fund variable, as opposed to the predicted 
positive sign.  According to this result, the funds raised later in the lifetime of the 
given fund manager are likely to be less profitable.  One possible reason for this is 
the fact that the most attractive and profitable opportunities have been already 
exploited, and it becomes harder to deliver the results on par with previous.  
However, one would expect that the new investment opportunities arise on 
continuous basis.  Given that our sample mostly consists of the funds being raised 
and realized during more or less the same period of time (the earliest vintage year 
is 1997, the latest is 2011), this negative relationship could be a reflection of the 
fact that private equity returns are correlated with the economic cycle, and earlier 
funds have captured “better times”.  This assertion would need a more thorough 
testing though.  In addition to the aforementioned argument, an incentives 
argument can apply - the manager might be less motivated to exert substantial 
effort to deliver the returns as good as in the previously raised funds due to 
decreased need to build the reputation and trust of investors.  In other words, the 
managers become “lazier”.  We should be cautious with the interpretation of this 
variable, as it might reflect the two different effects – the physical passage of time 
in the life of the given fund manager as well as the managerial skill accumulation.  
The sequence of the fund variable is also subject to the survivorship bias. 
Due to the scarcity of data and low variation in the sample it was not possible 
to include the capital committed by the General Partner in regressions and obtain 
meaningful results about this variable. 
The realized sign for the managerial fee is negative, which is inconsistent with 
the prediction.  Managerial fee is a performance-independent part of the GP’s 
compensation, which is usually proportional to the size of the fund.  The negative 
relationship between the return and managerial fee might indicate that the fixed 
fee, which is too high, hinders the incentive part (i.e. performance-dependent) of 
the fee structure and hurts motivation to deliver high returns. 
Due to the small sample, the realized sign of the carry interest and the carry 
hurdle variables cannot be determined from regression, or they are insignificant.  
However, both multivariate regressions returned the positive sign for the carry 
profit, which is consistent with the previous studies.  Carry interest is the 
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incentive part of the private equity structure – the larger the return, the more GP 
earns.  We can also presume that the higher the hurdle rate, the more incentivized 
fund managers are to achieve the return that will exceed the hurdle so that they 
can get hold of their carry interest.  Given the fact that these variables have very 
little variation in our sample, it is hard to draw a distinct conclusion.  We believe 
that the positive coefficient for the carry profit variable will be significant in the 
larger sample. 
The realized sign for the number of funds under simultaneous management is 
positive.  According to the previous research, it should be negatively correlated 
with the ability of the fund managers to generate superior returns: the more funds 
they manage, the less attention and time they can devote to each fund.  
Nonetheless, many fund managers can extract significant synergies from 
managing more funds simultaneously: they might use standardized procedures or 
professional services to cut the administrative and other costs both on the fund 
level and in portfolio companies, which is a common practice and one of the 
techniques to add value in the private equity industry. It can also reflect the skill 
accumulation. This can explain the positive correlation.   
The differences in the obtained and predicted signs of the coefficients could 
also arise from the specificities of the Nordic funds, as most of the empirical 
results of the previous research were based on the data samples from the US.  For 
any conclusive results, a more thorough comparative study should be conducted. 
5.2.1. Implied characteristics of the higher-performing private equity 
fund 
According to the achieved results and our data sample, the Nordic fund which 
would be likely to deliver high returns would possess the following 
characteristics: 
- not excessively large in size; 
- shorter than average vesting period; 
- relatively broad geographical focus; 
- one of the first funds raised by the respective managing PE firm (in a 
given timeframe, i.e. 1997-2011); 
- low managerial fee (low performance-independent compensation part); 
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- fund is being managed simultaneously with other fund/several funds. 
5.3 Robustness tests 
Robustness tests are designed to check consistency of the model results across 
various specifications.  They are performed to test if the findings are resistant 
(robust) to changes in the model, such as addition or removal of regressors, or 
alteration of proxies used to measure theoretical variables of interest to researcher.   
If such sensitivity analysis reveals variation in signs and magnitudes within 
plausible band, one can infer variables to be representative of factors they proxy 
for.  Otherwise, one can suspect a specification error in the model, which prohibits 
forming any conclusion due to low explanatory power of such unstable variables. 
In other words, robustness confirms structural validity of the model, or adequacy 
of the framework laid out to research the problem (White and Lu 2010). 
White and Lu warn against mistreating robustness in number of ways.  First, 
robustness by no mean implies causality; it only reaffirms correlation in each case 
(“correlation does not imply causation” holds).  Furthermore, only critical 
variables are required to make economic sense and generate robust findings.  A 
researcher may arbitrary define critical core variables, whose effects are of 
primary importance and a subset of non-core variables.  
 
Robustness is important in our case, because even when assumptions of the 
model are satisfied vaguely, robust estimators will still produce reasonably 
accurate description of correlation.  
Overall, the literature does not suggest unified or standardized approach to 
robustness tests. They might range from highly statistical and quantitative as in 
White and Lu (where separate tests are conducted just to single out core factors) 
to simple tests across multiple variations of factors combinations based on 
economic prudence.  We believe the latter approach suits our small sample better. 
5.3.1. Single linear regressions 
The most simplistic approach for checking the resilience of the independent 
variable coefficients is to check if the signs of coefficients from the multivariate 
regressions hold in case of single linear regressions.  To implement this technique, 
we run regressions of the following form:  
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The results are presented in the table below.  Both Net IRR and TVPI 
performance measurements were used.  The table does not provide the measures 
of the model fit (R-squared), as we are only interested in the sign and significance 
of the beta coefficients. 
Most of the independent variables do not exhibit statistical significance in 
single regressions.  Those variables that are statistically significant maintain the 
sign of the multivariate regressions.  These variables are size, vesting period and 
sequence of the fund.  Given that there are no contradictions between the signs of 
multivariate and single linear regressions coefficients, we do not get any 
indications that results are not robust. 
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Table 6. Single linear regressions 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. Some variables were omitted in the regressions due to the lack of the variability in the data or 
too few observations. 
 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable 
 Net IRR  TVPI  
Size  
-0.03  -0.45 *** 
(0.04)  (0.15)  
Vesting period 
-0.01 ** -0.06 *** 
(0.00)  (0.01)  
Specialization:     
-stage 
-0.08  -1.38 ** 
(0.12)  (0.53)  
-industrial 
-0.04  0.49  
(0.09)  (0.43)  
-geographical 
0.01  0.17  
(0.03)  (0.13)  
Sequence 
-0.01  -0.10 * 
(0.01)  (0.06)  
GP Capital committed 
-0.01  -0.03  
(0.01)  (0.05)  
Managerial fee 
-0.11  0.38  
(0.20)  (0.65)  
Carry profit 
0.01  0.02  
(0.02)  (0.13)  
Carry hurdle 
0.08  n/a  
(0.10)  n/a  
Simultaneous management 
-0.01  -0.02  
(0.02)  (0.08)  
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis  39 
 
 
Table 7. Comparison of the realized signs obtained in multivariate and single regressions. 
 
Theoretical variable 
Realized sign  
Multivariate regressions 
Realized sign     
Single regressions 
Size 
 
 
- 
 
- 
Vesting period 
 
 
- 
 
- 
Specialization:    
-stage 
 
 
insignificant 
 
- 
-industrial 
 
 
insignificant 
 
insignificant 
-geographical 
 
 
+ 
insignificant 
Sequence 
 
 
- 
- 
GP Capital commitment 
 
 
n/a 
insignificant 
Managerial fee 
 
 
- 
insignificant 
Carry profit 
 
 
insignificant 
 
insignificant 
Carry hurdle 
 
 
n/a 
 
insignificant 
Simultaneous management 
  
 
+ 
 
insignificant 
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5.3.2. Groups of factors 
 
We now apply an alternative approach to test robustness over broad areas of 
factors by regressing their combinations as shown in the table 8 below.  Thus we 
may observe how these groups interact with each other and infer if factor 
coefficients they consist of are robust.  Bands of characteristic seem to be more 
important than separate factors, as it is the pool of characteristics that matters for 
specification (e.g. when incentive system is set up optimally or GP is more 
skilled, fund characteristics might become less relevant etc.)  
We omit the two variables, the GP capital commitment and carry hurdle, which 
proved have too little variation to be used in a regression.    
 
To run the specified regressions, only the TVPI performance metric was used, 
since this sample is larger than the Net IRR sample, and the correlation between 
the two performance metrics is relatively high (0.91).  Table 9 shows the obtained 
results. 
 
We will now analyze these results in the framework of the three broad groups 
of factors – Fund Characteristics, Manager Characteristics (e.g. Skill) and 
Incentive Structure Characteristics. 
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Table 8. Alternative model specifications. 
Notes: ◆indicates which variables are included in the respective regression. 
  REGRESSIONS 
FACTORS  1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 
FUND Size  ◆ ◆   ◆ ◆ 
 
Vesting period ◆ ◆   ◆ ◆ 
 
Specialization:       
 
-stage ◆ ◆   ◆ ◆ 
 
-industrial ◆ ◆   ◆ ◆ 
 
-geographical ◆ ◆   ◆ ◆ 
 
SKILL Sequence ◆  ◆  ◆  
◆ 
INCENTIVE Managerial fee ◆   ◆  ◆ 
◆ 
Carry profit ◆   ◆  ◆ 
◆ 
Simultaneous management ◆   ◆  ◆ 
◆ 
 
Table 9.  Combined regressions. 
Notes: ***, **, and * in the column right of the respective regression indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The abbreviation of n.s. means “not significant”. 
  REGRESSIONS 
FACTORS  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
FUND Size  
- ** - *     - * - ***   
Vesting period 
- *** - **     - ** - ***   
Specialization: 
              
-stage 
- n.s. - n.s.     - n.s. - **   
-industrial 
- n.s. - n.s.     - n.s. - **   
-geographical 
+ * + n.s.     + n.s. + *   
SKILL Sequence 
- **   - *   - n.s.   - *** 
INCENTIVE Managerial fee 
- **     + n.s.   - * - n.s. 
Carry profit 
+ n.s.     + n.s.   + n.s. + n.s. 
Simultaneous man. 
+ **     - n.s.   - n.s. + *** 
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The variables in the first group, Fund Characteristics, all maintain their signs.  
Size and vesting period variables are significant under all the alternative model 
specifications.  The geographical specialization variable is only significant if the 
variables of the third group (Incentive) are present.  We conclude that the 
variables in this group are robust. 
The only variable in the GP Characteristics group, the sequence of the fund, 
maintains the sign in all the regressions, and exhibits the highest statistical 
significance in the regression 7, which is the combination of the variables of the 
second and third group.  The conclusion is that negative sign of sequence of the 
fund coefficient is robust. 
The variables of the third group, the Incentive Structure Group, exhibit some 
instability of the sign, however, all the results that are statistically significant 
maintain the same sign – managerial fee coefficient is only negative when 
statistically significant, while the simultaneous management coefficient is only 
positive.  The carry profit coefficient is not statistically significant under any 
model alternatives.  We can therefore conclude the robustness of the results in this 
group of variables as well. 
The variables simultaneous management and sequence of the fund interact in 
an interesting way: the coefficient of the simultaneous management variable is 
significant and positive only in the presence of the sequence of the fund variable 
in the regression equation, and the sequence variable is insignificant in regression 
5, which omits the third group of variables.  This effect is connected to the high 
correlation between the two variables (0.91 in IRR sample and 0.89 in TVPI 
sample), as shown in the correlation matrix of the independent variables.  The two 
variables are likely to be complementary and to reflect the same characteristic – 
the skill accumulation of the manager, but they have to be combined to convey 
this information.  We do not suspect that these two variables can cause a severe 
multicollinearity problem, as they are likely to bring in different information, 
which is indicated by the fact that they are statistically insignificant without the 
presence of the other variable.  
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6. Conclusions 
In our sample of Nordic PE funds we have found the following factors to 
increase performance: 
i. smaller funds, 
ii. shorter vesting periods,   
iii. wider geographical scope, 
iv. lower performance-independent compensation, 
v. being raised earlier in the manager’s tenure, 
vi. more funds under simultaneous management.  
The latter two factors were found to be strongly connected.  No significant 
effect was observed with industrial specialization or carry profit.  Nevertheless, in 
a larger sample, we would expect carry profit to be a significant, positive, 
performance contributor.     
Our findings are robust across various specifications of the model, with all 
significant coefficients maintaining signs in both multivariate and single linear 
regressions.   
Testing and contrasting the drivers on a larger sample from a different region 
and globally, poses significant interest for further research.  Nordic proprietary 
information transparency could be one cause of such regional distinctiveness.  
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7. Limitations 
Our study is inherently biased in that the data used for this research were based 
only on the sample of funds provided to us by the investment firm specializing in 
the secondary private equity investments.  Hence, the selected funds are subject to 
the survivorship and sample selection biases - the professionals of Cubera Private 
Equity AS have applied their skills and expertise to select these particular funds 
for screening in their investment universe.  Therefore, the funds in our data 
sample might be systematically different from those outside the sample in that the 
former exhibit superior performance or potential thereof.  Due to the proprietary 
nature of most of the data in the private equity industry, we have to accept these 
biases, as the possibilities for data collection from public sources are limited.  
The lack of the standardization of reporting in the private equity industry 
hinders the reliability of our dataset. This issue is crucial for the performance 
measures, especially the IRR.  In cases where the cash flows of the funds were not 
available, the funds’ own estimates or data from proprietary databases were used, 
which might lead to some level of inconsistency in the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References  45 
 
References 
 
Baks, K. P., and L. M. Benveniste. "Alignment of Interest in the Private Equity 
Industry." The Emory Center for Alternative Investments, Emory 
University Goizueta Business School  (2010). 
Chung, J., B. A. Sensoy, L.  H. Stern, and M. S. Weisbach. "Pay for Performance 
from Future Fund Flows: The Case of Private Equity." Review of 
Financial Studies, Forthcoming  (2011). 
Copeland, T.E., J.F. Weston, and K. Shastri. Financial Theory and Corporate 
Policy: Addison-Wesley, 2005. 
De Clercq, D., and D. Dimov. "A Knowledge-Based View of Venture Capital 
Firms’ Portfolio Investment Specialization and Syndication." Frontiers of 
Entrepreneurship Research  (2003): 49-63. 
Dodge, M., and A. B. Leibler. "Secondaries Transactions - Will This Be the 
Future Trend for Private Equity Transaction?". Melbourne: Arnold Bloch 
Leibler Lawyers and Advisors, 2010. 
Giot, P., and A. Schwienbacher. "Ipos, Trade Sales and Liquidations: Modelling 
Venture Capital Exits Using Survival Analysis." Journal of Banking & 
Finance 31, no. 3 (2007): 679-702. 
Gompers, P., and J. Lerner. "Assessing the Performance of Private Equity Funds." 
Harvard Business School  (2003). 
Gompers, P.A., and J. Lerner. "Risk and Reward in Private Equity Investments." 
The Journal of Private Equity 1, no. 2 (1997): 5-12. 
Heel, J., and C. Kehoe. "Why Some Private Equity Firms Do Better Than Others." 
The McKinsey Quarterly, no. 1 (2005): 24-26. 
Jones, C. M., and M. Rhodes-Kropf. "The Price of Diversifiable Risk in Venture 
Capital and Private Equity." SSRN eLibrary  (2003). 
Kaplan, S. N., and A. Schoar. "Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, 
and Capital Flows." The Journal of Finance 60, no. 4 (2005): 1791-823. 
Kaplan, S.N., and P. Stromberg. "Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity." The 
Journal of economic perspectives 23, no. 1 (2009): 121-46. 
Kaplan, S.N., and P. Strömberg. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real 
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts." Review of 
Economic studies 70, no. 2 (2003): 281-315. 
Lerner, J., and A. Schoar. "The Illiquidity Puzzle: Theory and Evidence from 
Private Equity." Journal of Financial Economics 72, no. 1 (2004): 3-40. 
References  46 
 
Leslie, P., and P. Oyer. "Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence 
from Private Equity." National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008. 
Ljungqvist, A., and M. P. Richardson. "The Cash Flow, Return and Risk 
Characteristics of Private Equity." SSRN eLibrary  (2003). 
Lopez de Silanes, F., L. Phalippou, and O. Gottschalg. "Giants at the Gate: On the 
Cross-Section of Private Equity Investment Returns." SSRN eLibrary  
(2009). 
Manigart, S., K. De Waele, M. Wright, K. Robbie, P. Desbrières, H. J. Sapienza, 
and A. Beekman. "Determinants of Required Return in Venture Capital 
Investments: A Five-Country Study." Journal of Business Venturing 17, 
no. 4 (2002): 291-312. 
Manigart, S., P. Joos, and D. De Vos. "The Performance of Publicly Traded 
European Venture Capital Companies." Journal of Small Business Finance 
3, no. 2 (1994). 
Metrick, A., and A. Yasuda. "The Economics of Private Equity Funds." Review of 
Financial Studies 23, no. 6 (2010): 2303-41. 
Peterman, S.D., and D. Lai. "From the Ashes Risen: Private Equity Secondary 
Funds Take Flight." The Journal of Private Equity 12, no. 4 (2009): 29-34. 
Phalippou, L., and O. Gottschalg. "The Performance of Private Equity Funds." 
The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 4, pp. 1747-1776, 2009  
(2009). 
Phalippou, L., and M. Zollo. "What Drives Private Equity Fund Performance?"  
(2006). 
Pratt, J.W., and R.J. Zeckhauser. "Principals and Agents: An Overview." 
Principals and Agents The Structure of Business  (1985): 1-35. 
Söderblom, A. , and J.  Wiklund. "Factors Determining the Performance of Early 
Stage High-Technology Venture Capital Funds: A Review of the 
Academic Literature.": Small Business Services, UK., 2005. 
White, H., and X. Lu. "Robustness Checks and Robustness Tests in Applied 
Economics." University of California, San Diego  (2010). 
 
 
APPENDICES  47 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Graph of residuals versus the dependent variable (Net IRR) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B. Graph of residuals versus the dependent variable (TVPI) 
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1. Objective and Motivation 
The research topic covers the private equity industry
8
 with the focus on Nordic 
funds.  Despite private equity having been gaining importance as a class of 
financial assets in the world
9
 and in Nordics in particular
10
, the in-depth analyses 
of the main factors behind the performance of the private equity funds in Nordic 
countries are scarce. 
Our research is focused on the secondary private equity market, which is the 
market for the secondary transactions with the pre-existing investments in private 
equity funds.  Inherently, private equity is an illiquid asset class and is aimed to be 
a buy-and-hold long term investment.  However, the desire of many investors to 
increase and diversify exposure to private equity, as well as their liquidity needs, 
have led to a significant growth of the secondary market during the past two 
decades.  It has been estimated to have increased from about $4.4 bn in 1997, to 
about $63 bn in 2007 (Peterman and Lai, 2009).  2011 was named “the busiest 
year on record in the private equity secondary market” by Cogent Partners, private 
equity-focused investment bank providing focused advisory services to the private 
equity secondary market. 
One of the reasons why secondary private equity market is so hot even during the 
global financial downturn is that sellers view it as a source of liquidity and exit.  
For the buyers, on the other hand, it is an opportunity to hand-pick the funds, and 
buy interests at possibly discounted prices.  Portfolio diversification and 
optimization is also an important driver of the rise of the secondary private equity 
market.  
Secondary PE transactions can be generally divided into two categories: sales of 
limited partnership interests (to a fund of funds typically) and sales of direct 
interests in portfolio companies (a buyer typically being another private equity 
fund) (Dodge and Leibler, 2010).  The incentives driving those two kinds of 
transactions can be slightly different: limited partners might be motivated to sell 
their interest due to a change in strategic positioning, regulatory change or cash 
                                                 
8
 We consider so-called private equity funds, which primarily invest in buyout and venture capital. 
9
 Capital raised globally by PE funds has increased from $33 bn in 1995 to $666 bn in 2008 
(Global Private Equity Report 2011 by Bain & Company)  
10
 An outstanding example is NBIM considering investments in private equity according to the 
strategy plan for 2011-2013 http://www.nbim.no/en/About-us/nbim-organisation/nbim-
governance/strategy-plan-2011-2013-/ 
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flow needs, while general partners would seek to sell the assets in case of the lack 
of management capacity (partner talent is limited), insufficient capital for follow-
on funding or unavailability of other exit opportunities, as well as to realize 
greater IRR.  The buyers are attracted by the opportunity to enter the fund at the 
later stage of its life, which promises a faster return on their investment, and also 
possibility to track the performance of the fund.  The understanding of the factors 
which drive performance of the private equity funds is crucial for secondary 
investors during the selection process and that constitutes the main aspiration of 
our research. 
The Nordic secondary private equity market has experienced dynamics similar to 
the global.  According to Thomson Reuters, the number of trade sales and 
secondary buyouts in Nordics has increased over the last decade as did the number 
of all private equity deals, and the percentage of secondary deals in all the deals 
has grown from 31% in 2000 (28 deals) to 42% in 2010 (84 deals).  Preqin, the 
leading provider of data and intelligence on alternative assets industry, reports that 
there are currently 61 investors located in the Nordic region that are considering 
the possibility of purchasing private equity or real estate fund stakes on 
the secondary market within the next 24 months, while, from the seller side,  there 
are currently 26 investors based in the Nordic region that are potentially looking 
to sell private equity or real estate fund interests.  
Given such developments in the global and Nordic private equity market, we see 
the secondary PE market as an exciting area of research, and will therefore 
concentrate our efforts in studying the private equity industry on the fund level, 
i.e. we will aggregate the data on portfolio companies belonging to the same fund. 
1.1 Contribution 
In our research, we will use a comprehensive dataset (described below), obtained 
from a private source and not analyzed before.  The main problem of the thesis is 
to identify and explore the driving factors of the Nordic private equity funds and 
estimate their inputs into funds’ excess returns.  
2. Introductory Review of Previous PE Studies 
The literature on private equity investments can be divided into two sets: the one 
focusing on performance of individual venture capital investments and another 
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focusing rather on funds than on separate investment projects and including 
buyout investments.  We are interested in the latter category since we concentrate 
our attention on various funds’ performance. 
2.1 Performance Measurement  
 In our research, we will face the problem of the adequate measurement of the 
fund performance. This question was addressed in the following papers: Gompers 
and Lerner (1997) is a pioneering work, describing the calculation of risk-adjusted 
fund returns (i.e. performance alpha).  This issue is also discussed in Ljungqvist 
and Richardson (2003) and Kaplan and Schoar (2005).  Phalippou and Zollo 
(2005) take a different approach to fund performance estimation by making 
several adjustments (like corrections for sample selection bias and “living dead” 
investments) to the previously used value-weighted average performance 
approach.  Further discussion of the relevant measurements of the fund 
performance follows in Section 4.1 Independent Variable. 
2.2 Determinants of Fund Performances 
The results of previous works will be used to identify the probable drivers of the 
fund performance.  In Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003), the fund size, a dummy 
variable for first-time funds, the portfolio beta, measures of portfolio 
diversification, vintage year, amount of committed capital, fund life, cost of funds, 
availability of investment opportunities and competition among private equity 
funds are explored as the determining factors of the PE funds performance.  Jones 
and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) examine how the principal-agent problem impacts the 
fund returns.  Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2010) include several 
other variables pertaining to PE firm’s scale and scope (controls for firm-specific 
structure, firm’s age etc.). We elaborate more on the factors of fund performance 
that might be of interest for our research in Section 4.2 Dependent Variables.  
2.3 Agency Problem in Private Equity setting 
One characteristic which crucially differentiates private equity investors from 
public market investors is the active ownership of the former. Therefore, we wish 
to draw particular attention to this issue.  The concept of active ownership, or a 
hands-on management style, means a high degree of involvement in portfolio 
companies.  In its core, the phenomenon of active ownership in private equity 
industry is closely tied to the principal-agent interaction.  Evidently, primary 
ATTACHMENT: Preliminary Thesis Report  54 
 
problems arising in the principal-agent relationship are information asymmetry 
(hidden information) and moral hazard (hidden action) (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 
1985).   
To elaborate, private equity funds are managed by General Partners (GP), while 
investors in the funds are Limited Partners (LP).   Thus active ownership is a 
governance mechanism used to mitigate agency problem between GP and target 
firm management.   This agency level has been covered widely in academia and 
was identified as a genuine value driver in private equity (Heel and Kehoe, The 
McKinsey Quartelry, 2005). In this research, the details of 60 PE deals from 11 
PE companies (defined by authors as leading) are investigated.  Company 
outperformance relative to industry peers is said to be the primary source of value 
creation (accounting for 63% of it).  Hence, it is concluded that PE firms create 
value through improving the companies they invest in.  Authors name five 
common features that characterize the top performers.  First, the top deal partners 
seek out expertise before making investments.  Second, the substantial and 
focused performance incentives are employed (we will elaborate more on this 
issue).  Third, they craft a more elaborate value creation plans, together with a 
rigid set of key performance indicators.  Fourth, they devote more hours to 
managing their investments.  Fifth, the management is replaced early in the life of 
a deal by the more successful deal partners.   
However, we are concerned with performance determinants of the fund on 
aggregate.  On this level GP are subject to a different kind of principal-agent 
problem, with LP's as principal and GP as an agent.   To assure sufficient effort 
from GP at maximizing fund's value, limited partnership contracts are designed to 
combat principal-agent problem in PE setting.   Thus, in the framework of our 
research, we are interested in contractual compensation structure and peculiar 
covenants of limited partnership agreement.  More in detail, we examine the 
impact of principal-agent problem between LP and GP on PE funds performance. 
 To be more precise, we want to relate the performance to incentives provided 
within limited partnership contracts, which are the dominant organizational form 
worldwide in PE industry (Gompers and Lerner, 1997) (and in case of our dataset 
too).   
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Further data assessment is needed to distill variables that signal contractual 
incentives.   There could be a different contractual balance between fixed fund-
size proportional fee and performance-based fee, charged by GP.  We would be 
interested to compare performance results of funds with different contractual 
compensation structures.  For the sake of example,  some contracts in our dataset 
include carry fee by GP, which implies that manager has a claim to certain share 
of profits should they exceed predetermined level (hurdle rate). 
3. Dataset 
Cubera AS
11
 will provide us with proprietary data on performance of around 160 
exits from mid-90’s and up to most recent, with each observation focused on 
single company under fund’s management.  Since we focus on fund level, data 
will undergo relevant aggregation.   Data will come both in printed format for 
exits two and more years ago and digitalized data for exits less than two years 
back in time.   
Overall data points will include type of investment (i.e. buyout, venture …), fund 
name, company name, vintage year, holding period, initial investment, value of 
the company 1 quarter preceding exit  sales price and comparison multiples.  
Those are peculiar data points which cannot be obtained from other sources and 
thus firms’ identities are subject to disclosure agreement.  Overall, printed data is 
presented in various layout and depth of coverage, but reflects mentioned points.  
All other in-depth financials and soft data can be either obtained from those 
reports or found on the internet, as this information is mostly publicly accessible 
(like income statements or corporate governance qualitative observations).  Our 
main data source for limited partnership structure covenants (including 
compensation) are private placement memoranda for the funds, provided by 
Cubera.   
3.1 Data Prioritizing Approach  
Each observation will start with a fund exit from a defined company.  First, we 
will dig for the hard data, which in our case will be data points mentioned above 
as well as financials. Typically, we will have high level financial data already 
                                                 
11
 Cubera Private Equity AS is a secondary private equity firm operating in Nordic market. 
http://www.cubera.no/ 
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compiled, which include sales/profitability/debt data.  Any additional information 
required by our model can be distilled either from reports available or public 
sources.  Our goal is to aggregate those observations for fund level to calculate its 
performance. 
Next step would be to acquire soft data, which presents a challenge of qualitative 
data assessment.  The data like fund investment strategy or specialization would 
first require an adequate data measuring system to be laid out.  On the other hand, 
aforementioned soft data will not pose availability constraint as it is integral part 
of typical private placement memoranda to which we would have access.  
4. Model and Variables 
In short, our aim is to create a multivariate model which can describe relations 
between fund performance and defined factors in conceptual form of: 
  Fund Performance =                 
Now, we proceed with defining dependant variable and independent factors 
expected to determine it. 
4.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in our model is the private equity fund performance. 
However, there is an ambiguity of how it can be measured. 
The basic measures of the private equity performance at the fund level are the 
internal rate of return (IRR), profitability index (PI) and the public market 
equivalent (PME) and return multiples (cash on cash ratios, e.g. total value to 
paid-in capital – TVPI).  Each of these measures has some advantages and 
drawbacks, and previous studies have indicated that regression results are 
sensitive to the performance measure used.  At the same time, it was shown that 
different private equity funds performance measures are highly correlated 
empirically (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). 
The internal rate of return (IRR) is the prevalent measure in the industry. The IRR 
of an investment is defined as any rate which equates the present value of the cash 
outflows and inflows associated with the investment. This is the rate of return that 
is earned from the investment (Copeland et al., 2005). However, it has three 
important pitfalls: it tends to favour shorter-term funds, there is no standard 
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method to calculate this measure which can potentially lead to different results 
and the IRR fails to take into account various fund characteristics (i.e. risk profile) 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2003). 
The profitability index (PI) is a measure based on the net present value (NPV) and 
it is defined as the net present value of cash flows over the initial investment.  The 
PI addresses several of the problems present in the IRR measure. The central 
question is the discount rate to be used. 
Arguably, the public market equivalent (PME) is more meaningful for the limited 
partners since it is the PI which compares an investment in a private equity fund to 
an investment in the public market (by discounting all the cash flows at the return 
to some public market index).   The selection of the proper benchmark is thus 
crucial. 
The main advantage of the return multiples is their simplicity, but the drawback is 
that they completely ignore the notion of the time value of money. 
In our thesis, we will calculate several measures of performance and use all of 
them in regression models as a means of robustness check. 
4.1.1. Risk associated with investments in private equity funds 
When measuring performance of private equity funds, we should consider the 
relevant risk of such investments.  The challenge of measuring the risk of private 
equity as an asset class was mentioned in several academic works.  A number of 
approaches for addressing the risk of the private equity funds have been 
developed.   
The pioneering study in this field was conducted by Gompers and Lerner in 1997. 
This work examines the risk-adjusted performance of a single fund group by 
marking-to-market each investment quarterly.  The obtained time series of 
portfolio value is regressed on various pricing factors, giving a performance alpha, 
which was found to be positive and significant. 
The more recent approach is the one developed by Ljungqvist and Richardson 
(2003).  To estimate the risk of each private equity fund, they suggest assigning 
the risk (beta in this case) to each portfolio company.  Using the capital 
disbursements as weights, the average equity beta of the fund is calculated. 
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In our research we use another approach.  Instead of trying to figure out the 
inherent risk of the private equity investments, we will use the return on the broad 
public equity index as a discount rate (this is relevant for PI and PME measures, 
but not for IRR).  We acknowledge that if private equity has beta higher than one, 
our measures will yield biased results by overstating the true risk-adjusted return 
to private equity.  However, in the analysis that follows, we will attempt to 
consider differences in risk by controlling for observable differences 
(industry/geographical specialization, partner competence etc.).  Given that our 
goal is to identify and study the drivers of private equity funds performance, this 
approach is sensible.  Yet, would our task be to compare the performance of 
private equity to the performance of another asset classes (e.g. public equity), we 
would have to adjust for the risk of private equity as a separate asset class 
explicitly. 
4.2 Independent Variables 
Having researched literature on determining sources of PE funds performance, we 
singled out three broad areas of possible factors to test: characteristics of the fund 
itself, competence of GP and GP/LP relationship within limited partnership. 
Fund Characteristics  
The first area of fund characteristics encompasses numerous determinants, such as 
fund size, duration and specialization:  
Size 
Fund size can alter performance through economies of scale effects, but previous 
studies documented diverse forms of correlation.  Kaplan and Schoar (2005) have 
found relationship to be concave in cross-section, but negative for individual 
GP’s.   Concavity can be attributed to limited availability of profitable deals, 
which becomes more evident when fund grows beyond certain threshold.  
Moreover, authors argue concavity of the PE production function to also be the 
cause, as managerial skills require time consumption. Phalippou and Gottschalg 
(2007) on the other hand have found the relationship to be positive and linear.   
We measure fund size by the total amount of capital committed to it.    As 
previous studies showed contradicting results, we expect size to have negative, 
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positive or concave correlation with performance.  Hence, linear and quadratic 
function forms will both be tested.   
Duration and vesting period 
Duration of the fund determines performance in a number of ways, namely in 
terms of investment and managing decisions timeframe.  It also alters the GP’s 
target return rate to compensate for illiquidity. Phalippou and Gottschalg (2007) 
find this relationship to be negative. 
Approach analogous to one used for fixed income securities is employed to 
calculate fund duration.  Thus duration is the  difference between average month 
of exit and average month of initial investment, with months weighted by present 
value of corresponding cash flows.  Previous studies hint at inverse expected 
correlation.   
Vesting period is contractually specified investment horizon into the fund 
measured in months with expected negative relationship. 
Specialization 
Specialization is wide set of characteristics of the funds which focus on certain 
dimensions.  Among those dimensions most prominent are geographic 
specialization, industrial specialization and stage specialization (VC vs. buyout).  
Specialization determines how narrow is the focus within one or couple of those 
dimensions.  Overall, studies have revealed narrow industrial focus and early 
stage specialization to have positive correlation with performance   (De Clercq 
2003).  Narrow geographic focus was found to have negative correlation with 
performance by Manigart (1994), although positive correlation might be expected 
due to local network effects.  Competing effects of the specialization are negative 
impact from loss of diversification and benefit of focused skills and knowledge 
accumulation, which are “hard to imitate” as postulated by Manigart et al (2002).   
Stage specialization will be measured as dummy variable taking value of 1 for VC 
specialized funds and zero otherwise. Positive correlation is expected.  
We measure geographic specialization and industrial specialization using 
concentration technique. We assume concentration of investments across given 
dimension to proxy specialization of a fund in this dimension.  Hence, percentage 
share of fund investments across industries/geographic regions is calculated and 
ATTACHMENT: Preliminary Thesis Report  60 
 
find consequential Herfindahl index of industrial/geographical concentration as 
sum of squared shares.  Resulting index will measure the degree of specialization 
with value of 1 for highly specialized fund in single industry/region and 
approaching zero with decreasing degree of specialization (thus higher 
diversification).  Expected variable sign is positive for industrial specialization 
index and negative for geographical.   
GP Characteristics 
Second broad area is characteristics of GP with respect to their competence, 
knowledge and skills, which could be proxied by performance persistence and 
fund sequence: 
GP Persistence  
Persistence outlines continuity of GP in generating returns, or in other words how 
much current fund performance is determined by previously managed funds 
results. It is expected that such continuity will signal of GP skills development 
and experience accumulation. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find economically and 
statistically significant persistence in PE funds performance even for funds two 
lags apart.   Phalippou and Gottschalg (2007) support this argument as well by 
showing that current fund is most likely to perform in the same tercile 
(performance band) as GP’s previous fund.  
In our approach, measuring persistence involves regressing focus fund 
performance on lagged values of performance measures for previous funds run by 
corresponding GP.  Positive correlation is expected.   
Sequence 
Sequence is the order of the fund raised by GP.  In general, it is characteristic both 
of the fund and GP.  However, we have chosen to attribute it to GP, as higher 
sequence is another signal of previous success and managing reputation.    Both 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2007) document 
positive correlation between sequence and performance. Nevertheless, well 
performing GP has higher chance of raising next fund, which triggers survivorship 
bias to control for. 
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Obvious ordinal measurement for the variable is the chronological ranking of the 
focus fund in GP’s managerial history and positive sign is predicted by research.  
Principal-Agent Relationship Characteristics 
The last set of determinants comes from the principal-agent relationship between 
LP and GP, aimed at reducing agency costs and incentivizing GP’s managing 
performance.  Such determinants outline the mechanisms of corporate governance 
within the fund, and we chose most quantifiable measures – GP capital 
commitment, management fee, GP’s profits carry (allocation of gains from 
investments) and number of funds managed simultaneously:  
GP Capital commitment 
Capital committed by GP to invest in the fund provides incentive to maximize 
funds value and thus returns, of which GP will retain share proportional to 
commitment.  We would expect GP to perform better when more of their capital is 
at stake.  Thus, we measure GP commitment as a percentage share in total fund 
commitments and expect positive sign if this incentivisation mechanism if 
effective.  
Managerial fee 
Management fee is performance-independent part of compensation, and thus 
might provide insufficient incentive if too high. Number of issues arises and 
suggests fee level should be tested with respect to level and possibly fee 
composition, whether it is fixed or proportional.  Fixed fee might provide 
insufficient compensation for large funds.  Still, proportional fee could induce GP 
to inflate fund size beyond scope of investment opportunities on the market.     
Mangerial fee variable will be measured in percentage relative to total funds 
committed with positive expected sign.  In addition, we include dummy variable 
fee rigidity to reflect whether fee is fixed on level or proportional (1=fixed, 0 
otherwise) with expected sign undetermined due to contradicting incentive forces.   
Carry interest 
Carry interest is profit share of GP’s when profits surpass a determined percentage 
level (hurdle).  Thus, this is the most refined compensation mechanism, as it 
provides incentive to grow and a benchmark to achieve.  Potential conflict of 
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interest might arise, e.g. when GP chasing to bypass high benchmark hurdle 
allocates money to inappropriately high-risk investments. 
Therefore, we include both hurdle percentage and a profit sharing percentage as 
our measurements of these independant variables (since they proxy for conflicting 
incentives and hazards).   Hurdle is expected to correlate either negatively or 
positively with performance, while profit share is predicted to have positive 
correlation.  
In addition to testing levels of carry interest, it is sensible to test structure of 
realized fees, i.e. share of GP’s carry profit in their total returns.  Metrick and 
Yasuda (2010) have found that 2/3 of revenues by GP are earned as fixed 
management fees, which might suggest weakened link between performance and 
GP reward (Chung et al, 2010).  We will examine this peculiar relationship in 
descriptive statistics.  
Simultaneous management 
Number of funds managed at one time creates potential conflict of interest across 
those funds.  As outlined by Baks and Benveniste (2010), simultaneous 
involvement of GPs in several funds might lead to suboptimal management, such 
as focusing on high-performance fund and disregarding sinking one, engaging in 
as many funds as possible to collect more fees, simultaneous involvement in one 
investment project by means of two funds (e.g. by investing in different securities 
types)  etc.  All in all, simultaneous management by GPs requires testing for 
adverse incentives effects on performance.   Therefore, we measure this variable 
by number of funds measured with focused fund and generally expect negative 
sign.   
4.3 Model Setup 
As described in Secion 4.1, the fund’s performance is the dependent variable in 
our model.  Practically, it can be represented by three measures: IRR, PI and 
PME.  We will use all of them in the empirical part of our research to capture any 
sensitivities arising from the specifics of the performance metric used.  Hence, the 
dependent variable will have the following values: 
 
 Y1: Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
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 Y2: Profitability Index (PI) 
 Y3: Public Market Equivalent (PME) 
 
Subsequently, our research goal is to test the effects of three sets of factors 
described in part 4.2  on Nordic PE funds performance.  Those factors have either 
been proven by previous studies to demonstrate significant correlation with 
performance, or are expected to have impact by our theoretical setup (as in case 
with governance mechanisms).   Tests will be conducted both on univariate and 
multivariate levels to control for adverse effects and verify robustness.   
 
We generalize our testable model in the following multiple regression form: 
 
 
                       
                                    
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                         
                           
 
 
The summary of the model is as follows:  
 
Theoretical variable Empirical proxy Exp. sign 
Size TCC*/TCC squared + or -
/concave 
Duration Fixed-income method, months - 
Vesting period Fund contractual  horizon, months - 
Specialization:   
- stage VC/Buyout dummy + 
- industrial  HHI** for investments conc. within industries + 
- geographical HHI** for investments conc. within regions - 
GP persistence Lagged performance of n previous GP funds + 
Sequence Chronological order of fund in GP track 
record 
+ 
GP Capital committed  GP cap. comm.  proportional to TCC + 
Managerial fee Fee level proportional to TCC + 
Fee rigidity Fixed/proportional dummy + or - 
Carry hurdle Hurdle profit rate to surpass  + or - 
Carry profit Profit share of GP above hurdle + 
Simultaneous management Number of funds managed simultaneously - 
* Total capital committed 
** Herfindahl index 
